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ABSTRACT. Insofar as the notion of forgiveness stems from the Jewish and
Christian traditions, it seems to point at something very extraordinary.
Although Christianity recommends or even commissions forgiveness to every-
body, it nevertheless seems to consist of something which is not humanly pos-
sible: how could one remember the evil committed (and remember it as evil),
and at the same time not blame the one who committed it? By ultimately
reserving the entitlement and ability to forgive to God, by describing human
forgiveness as a theological virtue, and by emphasizing the gratuitous or gra-
cious character of forgiveness, this tradition seems most of all to show that for-
giveness is generally speaking impossible. In this paper, this conception of for-
giveness is presented with the help of Jacques Derrida. The question how this
apparently impossibility nevertheless sometimes happens is first answered with
the help of Thomas Aquinas. Against this background, the paper claims that
a ‘secular’ interpretation of forgiveness is also possible, which does justice to
its being humanly impossible. Such interpretation describes forgiveness as an
intersubjective act.
KEYWORDS. Forgiveness, Derrida, (theological) virtue, Thomas Aquinas.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I try to make sense of the paradoxical nature of forgive-ness. I start with a description of this paradox. In the second section
I indicate the reasons for stressing this paradox. And in the concluding
third section, I will suggest an interpretation of it with the help of a glance
at a traditional theological interpretation.
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2. FORGIVENESS AS IMPOSSIBILITY
We know Jacques Derrida’s paradoxical judgement on forgiveness, say-
ing that only the unforgivable can be forgiven, or that forgiveness “must
announce itself as impossibility”; “it can only be possible in doing the
impossible” (Derrida 2000, 85). But his text on forgiveness, inspiring and
challenging as it may be, does not argue very clearly why forgiveness would
be so paradoxical and why this paradox would be insurmountable. I there-
fore want to spell out my own understanding of forgiveness, which – 
I think – concurs with Derrida’s.
Let us assume that forgiveness is something that occurs between a
victim and a perpetrator. Furthermore, let us assume that when someone
forgives, the offence committed has not been forgotten, but the perpe-
trator is nevertheless no longer reproached for it, such that the relation-
ship between victim and perpetrator will no longer be a matter of remorse
and revenge. How could something such as this ever be possible?
If the harm done to a person is remembered as such, i.e., as a wrong,
it will be something that still is being condemned. If, or insofar as the
wrong continues to be associated with the perpetrator, the latter will as
such (i.e., as perpetrator) also continue to be condemned. It seems as if for-
giveness is only possible under the condition that either the wrong is
undone, which in many (or at least in some) cases is simply impossible;
or that wrong and perpetrator have become radically dissociated. The lat-
ter might occur when the perpetrator not only admits to the act, but also
shows remorse and atones for the wrong. In that case, the harmful act
could stay condemned, but this condemnation would no longer effect the
perpetrator in the manner it previously had. Because of the confessional,
remorseful, and atoning attitude, the former perpetrator would have
become a different person, no longer stuck to his deed. Should we con-
sider these three acts – confession, remorse, and atonement – through
which the perpetrator can become a different person, to be the conditions
for forgiveness?
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Do these conditions solve the problem and overcome the apparent
impossibility of forgiveness? Or have we rather lost sight of the phenom-
enon altogether? Can we really still speak of forgiveness in a situation in
which the perpetrator has radically dissociated himself from the act?
Would we not rather call a person resentful, or obsessively tied to the
past, if she would not forgive the former perpetrator in such a situation?
And could we still speak of forgiveness if it is thus considered a norm or
a matter of obligation? Should forgiveness not be something else (and
more) than the opposite of a psychic or moral pathology? In other words:
if there has been confession, remorse, and atonement, would it not be
appropriate to say that the perpetrator does not deserve to be considered
as a wrongdoer any longer? However, surely forgiveness is not a matter
of ‘giving somebody what they deserve.’ It rather seems to be a com-
pletely free gift, a gift which cannot be necessitated or exacted by any
merit.
If my presumptions are correct, we reach a paradoxical conclusion:
either forgiveness is impossible (i.e., in cases where guilt or the connec-
tion between the perpetrator and the evil committed cannot be over-
come); or there is no forgiveness (i.e., in cases where the connection
between act and perpetrator has been cut and guilt has been confessed).
Undeserved forgiveness seems to be impossible, while deserved forgive-
ness seems to be no forgiveness at all.
Must we not admit that forgiveness is a matter of ‘all or nothing’,
and thus that in fact a little forgiveness or conditional forgiveness is not
possible at all? Suppose that I forgive somebody, because, or assuming,
it will be good for that person or profitable to myself. In that case, 
I would have to withdraw my forgiveness if the effect of it turns out to
be different from what had been expected. If this is impossible, it sug-
gests that forgiveness cannot be conditional. Remorse cannot be condi-
tional to forgiveness either. It would imply that I could withdraw my
remorse when the forgiveness unexpectedly did not follow. Just as
remorse cannot be based on expected forgiveness, forgiveness cannot be
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based on the expectation of remorse. It seems that, as for remorse, also
forgiveness cannot be exacted from someone – it cannot be necessitated
by certain causes and it cannot be motivated by expectation. It is an act
that is radically free and creative to such an extent that it seems highly
improbable and at least unintelligible and enigmatic.
To summarize my explorations so far in the form of an argument:
since forgiving presupposes that one does not forget what is to be for-
given, but remembers it; and since what is being remembered is the per-
petrated act as evil, and as being done by the perpetrator more or less
intentionally; since therefore the perpetrator is being remembered as
linked to his evil act and thus as evil and blameworthy himself; and since
to forgive the perpetrator would mean that he would not any longer be
blamed, and thus would no longer be conceived as evil, the conclusion
seems to follow that forgiveness is a contradictory or at least paradoxical
combination of seeing the actor as evil and at the same time not seeing
him as evil. Whether we have to speak of a contradiction or a paradox is
open yet. If Derrida says that forgiveness “can only be possible in doing
the impossible” (Derrida 2000, 85), he seems to try to turn the (impossi-
ble) contradiction into a (possible) paradox. Before elaborating this a bit
further in the last section, I first want to say something about why I want
to stress this impossibility.
3. WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO STRESS THIS IMPOSSIBILITY OF FORGIVENESS
One might object that the conclusion only holds for a very strict or even
extreme meaning of ‘forgiveness.’ I would agree, but add that it is impor-
tant to underline this strict or extreme meaning of ‘forgiveness’, even if
this would lead to a paradox or a contradiction. The main reason for this
is philosophical. If philosophy is an effort to understand reality as it pres-
ents itself to us, then its first and main task can be phrased with Aristo-
tle as: to save the phenomena (diasooizein ta phainomena). We should not 
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collect too many (more or less) similar phenomena under one and the
same name, before we know to what extent they are similar or different.
We should at least start from the assumption, as even Derrida does, that
there is “some ‘proper’ meaning of this word” (i.e., forgiveness),1 and that
it therefore should not be “confounded… with related themes [like]:
excuse, regret, amnesty, prescription, etc.” (Derrida 2000, 81); nor should
the phenomenon itself be confounded with “some therapy or ecology of
memory” (Derrida 2000, 84).
Up to now I have not mentioned the political use of the term ‘for-
giveness’, which is the main target for Derrida’s criticism. This political
use might bring in an extra reason to be rather ‘purist’ with regard to ‘for-
giveness’, because here ‘use’ very easily becomes ‘abuse’ in the framework
of some kind of power strategy. But we don’t have to refer to this polit-
ical abuse, or to Desmond Tutu’s Christianization of the work done by
the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in South Africa (cf. Derrida
2000, 90), or to any “‘ecological’ imperative of social and political health”
(ibid.) whatsoever, which attempts to present itself as some kind of ‘for-
giveness,’ if we try to circumscribe what forgiveness really is, and how it
should be distinguished from all kinds of ‘finalized’ acts that seem to
intend some sort of healing. “A ‘finalized’ forgiveness is no forgiveness;
it is only a political strategy or a psychological economy” (Derrida 2000,
96). “Forgiveness does not, it should never amount to a therapy of rec-
onciliation” (Derrida 2000, 90).
We even may not have to refer to extreme (political or other) cases
of forgiveness, such as forgiving ‘on behalf of’ the victim (e.g., in cases
when the victim is killed), to get a view of this impossible ‘proper’ for-
giveness: even forgiveness between two people, one of whom has
offended the other, already seems impossible. Take the situation of two
former friends or lovers, and suppose that one has deceived or behaved
violently towards the other. The victim is hurt and disappointed and
demands some form of apology before the relationship can be restored.
The offender regrets what has happened, but since the victim demands a
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confession of guilt, an apology, and the promise that the event will not
recur, the reconciliatory act, which can only be performed as a free act
and not as one of subjection, is made impossible. Moreover, the offender
feels misunderstood, because the act has been condemned uncondition-
ally. But the offender knows that he did not act without reason; he might
want to explain why the event happened, and show that – although it
cannot be justified – it can at least be explained and understood. How-
ever, the victim is only willing to forgive if the offender ceases to insist
on the understandability of the event, while the offender can only change
this interpretation and show remorse if the victim is willing to – at least
momentarily – show some understanding and accept the understandabil-
ity of the act. The offender requires the victim to understand that there
were prior events which contributed to the action, but the victim cannot
put herself in the position of the actor who made her into a victim. It
seems that the conditions that must be met before the relation can be
restored are impossible to achieve. There can be no forgiveness without
remorse, and only when the victim has proven to be forgiving can the
offender show sufficient remorse to make forgiveness possible. Indeed:
relations can get caught up in accusations and deaf ears because undoing
the damage seems to presuppose that the damage is already undone. This
does not exclude, however, that the relation between people can be clar-
ified and improved on, or that they can start again and learn to forget
about what happened. But this is all different from ‘forgiveness’ in a ‘pure’
and ‘proper’ sense.
This brings me to a final reason for keeping ‘forgiveness’ apart from
other, more-or-less related phenomena. For maybe we should accept that
the conceptual impossibility of ‘forgiveness’ does not exclude that for-
giving sometimes happens. At least according to some, the impossible
does happen, at least now and then. Acknowledging the impossibility or
inconceivability of forgiveness might help us to understand what 
happened when people experienced this impossible forgiveness, and 
what they have done to give words to experiences they made with this
ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES – SEPTEMBER 2008
— 374 —
Ethical Perspectives 15 (2008) 3
1523-08_EthPersp_05_Tongeren  19-09-2008  14:10  Pagina 374
impossibility. How did they account for the impossibility of what they
did experience nevertheless? What can we learn from them?
4. HOW THE IMPOSSIBLE SOMETIMES MAY HAPPEN
Stories by victims of war crimes, stories from the TRC in South Africa,
as well as stories about interpersonal relational problems, suggest that
sometimes (even if very rarely) real forgiving may happen between human
beings.2 People sometimes seem to be able to grant forgiveness, uncon-
ditionally, and despite the seriousness of the offence.
Practical philosophy should try to understand this and to interpret it
in such a way that it gives a fair account of this experience as well as of
the impossibility of what is experienced. In this concluding section I want
first to point to a way in which religious thought has attempted such an
interpretation, and secondly to suggest – even if only very tentatively – a
more secular interpretation of the indicated experience.
For the religious interpretation, I refer to two points in what Thomas
Aquinas wrote on forgiveness in his Theological Summa (cf. Van Tongeren
1996). The place where Thomas deals with ‘forgiveness’ explicitly in the
Theological Summa is already revealing: not (or scarcely) in the ethical and
anthropological second part,3 but in the theological, soteriological third
part of the book (cf. III q. 84-90 and suppl. 1-27). Forgiveness is ulti-
mately an act performed by God. It can be seen as an act of God, since
it is a (non-retributive) answer to an evil act, and since all evil is ultimately
a disruption of the good order as designed by God, and thus as a sin
against God. Even David, who sent his general Uria to a hopeless war so
as to take his wife, confessed to God: I have sinned against you alone, tibi
soli peccavi (Psalm 51). And if the offence is ultimately directed against
God, God is ultimately the only one who could grant forgiveness. This
certainly is a way to solve our problem, since it saves both the experience
of forgiveness (sometimes God does forgive in a completely gratuitous
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and gracious act) as well as its (human) impossibility. What is impossible
to us, may be possible for God.
Could this also help to solve the problem of how human beings some-
times are (or seem to be) able to forgive? Still according to moral theol-
ogy it can to some extent. For if we accept there to be so-called theolog-
ical virtues, human beings sometimes can act themselves in a divine way.
A theological virtue is a disposition which shows God’s activity in at least
two ways: not only does God act through us when we act from such a
disposition, but the disposition itself is also not so much cultivated by us
(as is true with the cardinal virtues) as ‘infused’ in us by God.
Forgiveness could be conceived as one of the parts of the theologi-
cal virtue of charity (which Thomas Aquinas does not do, by the way).
Charity (like all theological virtues) is from a human or ‘terrestrial’ point
of view often a kind of madness: doesn’t one have to be mad to embrace
the lepers? If forgiveness is an act of charity, and if acts of charity are pos-
sible (and we do assume that they are, since we praise people like Mother
Theresa of Calcutta for their charity), then we have found an interpreta-
tion of what Derrida writes: “if I say, as I think, that forgiveness is mad,
and that it must remain a madness of the impossible, this is certainly not
to exclude or to disqualify it” (Derrida 2000, 89).
But there is a further point in what Aquinas writes with regard to
forgiveness, which we must take into consideration. Forgiveness is an
answer to a sinful act. This sinful act (offensa) has a ‘subjective’ and an
‘objective’ side. The subjective side is the offence, the insult or affront to
the victim or to God. This side can be answered by a magnanimous, gen-
erous and certainly supererogatory act of love and forgiveness. But there
is also the objective side: the injury that is caused by the evil act, the bond
that is broken, the damage that is caused. For God it is rather easy to for-
give, because He cannot ‘objectively’ be hurt by the evil act. He is ‘sub-
jectively’ offended, but the harm caused by this offence is completely and
only on the side of the sinner or the perpetrator. For Aquinas this is the
reason that – even if God has forgiven – remorseful repentance and
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restorative penance are still needed, because without these, the objective
disruption continues to exist. This also explains why he can recommend
such uncompromising measures against heretics (IIaIIae 11.3). But what
does this mean for human forgiving? Even if human beings are enabled
to forgive by the help of divine grace and theological virtues, the ‘objec-
tive’ side of an offence between human beings is real harm for both and
certainly for the victim. Should this not mean that between human beings
forgiveness and repentance have to keep up with each other? But does-
n’t that mean that human forgiveness cannot but turn into something
‘conditional,’ whereas we took its unconditionality to be part of its essen-
tial impossibility?
In concluding, I can only very briefly point at the direction in which
I would like to search for a secular interpretation of human forgiveness,
which accounts for its impossibility as well as for the experience that for-
giveness sometimes does happen nevertheless.
What in the language of theology and the theological virtues is
expressed in terms of God’s acting through us seems to be mirrored in
stories about experiences of forgiving, when people say that they don’t
understand themselves how they (‘suddenly’) were able to do what they
deemed impossible, or that their own forgiving rather happened to them
in stead of being performed by them.
Especially this last expression could, philosophically speaking, refer
to the phenomenon of inter-subjectivity. An intersubjective act is an act
which is not so much performed by either subject, but which happens
between them. I cannot greet you, without you understanding my lifted
arm as a greeting. Without your appropriate understanding of my behav-
iour, my lifting my arm is only an effort to greet, at most. Not only do
you have to understand and interpret it in the right way, you also have to
accept it as a greeting, maybe even to answer the greeting, for it to be a
greeting.
This sounds, however, once again as if there are conditions that have
to be met, whereas we assumed that forgiveness had to be unconditional.
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Maybe, but at least this is not a condition that has to fulfilled before the
act of greeting (or of forgiving) can take place. On the contrary: I have
to act unconditionally as if I am greeting you, and you have to act uncon-
ditionally so as to interpret this behaviour of mine, and then the intersub-
jective act of greeting may happen between us. Something like this might
be true for forgiving. But we might first need a stronger example of an
intersubjective act; let’s take running into someone. Both you and I have
to do something to make this possible, but without this ‘something’ being
conditional to what the other does. I did not make my walking around
conditional to your being there, nor did you; but your and my walking
around are conditional to the encounter that may (or may not) happen to
both of us.
With regard to forgiveness, this would mean that both you and I have
to do something unconditionally before there be a chance that something
like forgiveness occurs. I have to remember your evil act as such, but at
the same time to generously allow the possibility of a new turn to our
common history; you have to do whatever you can to repair the harm
done without doing as if this could ever make the deed undone; and then
something like forgiveness may happen between us – even if it most prob-
ably will not happen, and it certainly will not happen very often. If this is
correct, forgiveness may be called conditioned, but without the acts to be
performed being conditional.
Maybe we have to distinguish between (1) forgiveness as a virtuous
disposition, an attitude which makes someone prepared to let stories take
a new direction and to let former offenders be ‘reborn’, and (2) forgive-
ness as an event which might take place under certain conditions without
ever being guaranteed, and (3) the act of forgiving. Maybe we should say
that although the act is impossible, we are nevertheless summoned to pre-
pare ourselves to the taking place of the impossible.
Finally, if along these lines we could produce a fair interpretation of
what happens if forgiveness takes place, it will be obvious that it is at its
most a very rare event between human beings. To transpose this to the
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public realm, let alone to organize or ‘use’ it for political purposes, is mak-
ing out of this sublime impossibility an absurd reality.
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NOTES
1. We are surprised to find Derrida using this concept of a “proper meaning”, since accord-
ing to his theory of meaning, this would be a contradictio in adiecto. Maybe we should read the quo-
tation marks as an apology or irony? However, he does not use quotation marks with the word
‘pure’ in the following passage: “I will risk this proposition: each time forgiveness is at the serv-
ice of a finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each
time that it aims to re-establish a normality (social, national, political, psychological) by a work of
mourning, by some therapy or ecology of memory, then the “forgiveness” is not pure – nor is its
concept.” (Derrida 2000, 84).
2. Examples can be found in Van Tongeren (2000) and Van Tongeren (2005).
3. There are some remarks on forgiveness in IaIIae 108.4, 113.2, 113.6f and IIaIIae 32.2 and
67.4.
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